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Measuring Investors' Historical Returns: Hindsight Bias In Dollar-
Weighted Returns 
 
Abstract 
A growing number of studies use dollar-weighted returns as evidence that consistently bad timing 
substantially reduces investor returns, and that consequently the equity risk premium must be 
considerably lower than previously thought. These studies measure the impact of bad timing as 
the difference between the geometric mean return (corresponding to a buy-and-hold strategy) and 
the dollar-weighted return. However, the present paper demonstrates that this differential 
combines two distinct effects: The correlation of investor cashflows with (i) future asset returns, 
and (ii) past asset returns. Both correlations tend to alter the dollar-weighted return, but only the 
first affects investors’ expected wealth. The second generates a hindsight bias.  
This paper also derives a method which separates these two effects. The results show that the 
great majority of the return differential for mainstream US equities has been due to hindsight 
bias, and very little due to bad investor timing. Dollar-weighted returns have been low because 
aggregate investment flows reflect past returns rather than future returns, and these low returns 
should not lead us to adopt correspondingly low estimates of the risk premium. The 
decomposition method which is derived here also has many applications in other fields where 
dollar-weighted returns are used, such as project finance and investment management.  
JEL Classification: G11, G12, G15 
Keywords: risk premium, dollar-weighted return, investment, equity 
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Measuring Investors' Historical Returns: Hindsight Bias In Dollar-
Weighted Returns 
 
Few figures are of such central importance in finance as the equity risk premium, yet 
estimates vary widely. In particular, a growing number of studies argue that investors time their 
investments so badly that on average they earn returns which are significantly below the buy-
and-hold return on the corresponding market index. They conclude from this that the risk 
premium must be substantially lower than had previously been thought.  
This emerging literature stems from an influential paper by Dichev (2007), who argues 
that the impact of bad timing on aggregate investor returns can be deduced using a simple and 
elegant method. The geometric mean (GM) of monthly market returns gives the return that would 
be earned if investors followed a strict buy-and-hold strategy, immediately re-investing any 
dividends. By contrast, the dollar-weighted (DW) return takes account of the net cashflows paid 
or received by the average investor ahead of the terminal period, such as share issues, dividend 
payments or share buybacks. The difference between these two rates is then used as a measure of 
the effect the timing of these cashflows has on investor returns.  
Using this method Dichev concludes that poor timing has led to a substantial reduction in 
investor returns: A 1.3% per annum reduction for equities traded on NYSE and AMEX 
exchanges (1926 to 2002) and a 5.3% reduction for NASDAQ stocks (1973 to 2002), as shown in 
Table I. This would imply that the equity risk premium earned by investors (and firms’ cost of 
capital) must be considerably lower than previously estimated. 
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Table I 
Investor Timing Effects Identified by Previous Studies 
The table shows the annualized Geometric Mean (GM) and Dollar-Weighted (DW) returns derived by previous 
studies for the markets and periods shown. A positive differential (final column) is interpreted as the reduction in the 
return received by investors as a result of bad timing. Distributions are defined as net cash distributions by firms to 
investors – a negative distribution represents an additional net investment (eg. as investors buy new share issues). 
The correlation coefficients in columns 4 and 5 are calculated on mean returns over the previous/subsequent three 
years (Dichev and Dichev/Yu), and one year (Clare/Motson). 
   
Correlation of 
distributions with:    
Market    Period Authors Past 
returns 
Future 
returns 
GM DW GM - DW 
NYSE/AMEX 1926-2002 Dichev -0.26 0.51 9.9% 8.6% 1.3% 
NYSE/AMEX 1926-1964 Dichev -0.41 0.54 9.6% 8.0% 1.6% 
NYSE/AMEX 1965-2002 Dichev 0.09 0.44 10.1% 9.4% 0.7% 
NYSE/AMEX 1926-1951 Keswani/Stolin   7.5% 5.8% 1.8% 
NYSE/AMEX 1951-1977 Keswani/Stolin   9.5% 9.7% -0.2% 
NYSE/AMEX 1977-2002 Keswani/Stolin   12.6% 12.9% -0.3% 
NASDAQ 1973-2002 Dichev -0.57 0.28 9.6% 4.3% 5.3% 
NASDAQ 1973-2006 Keswani/Stolin   10.4% 7.5% 2.9% 
19 International stock exchanges  1973-2004 Dichev -0.24 0.16   1.5% 
19 International stock exchanges  1973-2004 Keswani/Stolin     0.7% 
UK mutual funds (all flows) 1992-2009 Clare/Motson -0.18 -0.02 6.5% 5.7% 0.8% 
UK mutual funds (retail flows) 1992-2009 Clare/Motson -0.37 0.09 6.5% 5.4% 1.2% 
UK mutual funds (institn'l flows) 1992-2009 Clare/Motson -0.03 -0.08 6.5% 6.2% 0.3% 
US mutual funds (all)  1991-2004 Friesen/Sapp     1.6% 
Hedge funds (7190 funds) 1980-2006 Dichev/Yu -0.22 0.04 10.0% 6.4% 3.6% 
 
Keswani and Stolin (2009) challenge the robustness of these results, noting that the 
differential for NYSE/AMEX stocks is sensitive to the exact start and end dates chosen. Dichev 
finds that the differential falls to 0.7% per annum in the second half of the period, but Keswani 
and Stolin find that it disappears entirely if the time series is split at different points. They also 
find that the differential for NASDAQ stocks shrinks substantially when four years’ subsequent 
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data are included, and that the differential recorded for international stock exchanges was 
influenced by a dramatic increase in the proportion of stocks included in these indexes. 
However, studies using the same method have found differentials in other markets which 
are similar to those reported by Dichev. Friesen and Sapp (2007) find a differential of 1.6% per 
annum for US mutual funds, Clare and Motson (2010) a differential of 0.8% for UK funds, and 
Dichev and Yu (2011) a differential of 3.6% for hedge funds. A consensus has thus emerged that 
the aggregate effects of bad investor timing have been substantial. 
 
These studies all use the difference between GM and DW returns to measure the impact 
of bad investment timing. However, we demonstrate below that this differential combines two 
distinct effects: the correlation of investor cashflows with (i) future asset returns, and (ii) past 
asset returns. Both correlations tend to alter the DW return, but only the first affects investors’ 
expected wealth. The second generates a hindsight bias. 
 
Section II derives a method for quantifying and removing the effects of this hindsight 
bias. The results show that for mainstream US equities (those traded on NYSE and AMEX) the 
great majority of the differential between DW and GM returns has been due to the hindsight bias, 
and very little due to bad investor timing. DW returns are low because aggregate investment 
flows reflect past returns, rather than future returns. The effect of bad timing of investment in 
NASDAQ stocks is also much smaller than was initially calculated. Furthermore, Table I shows 
that distributions in other markets are generally much more strongly correlated with previous 
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returns than with future returns. This suggests that the return differentials recorded for these 
markets are also likely to be largely due to hindsight bias. 
This contribution of the present paper is: (i) it helps to resolve the current debate about 
the equity risk premium by showing that low DW returns do not imply correspondingly low risk 
premia; (ii) it derives a new method which can be used to separate genuine bad timing from 
hindsight bias in any context in which DW returns are used. This method is likely to find 
applications in many other fields, since the DW return is still commonly used (as the internal rate 
of return, IRR) in project finance and investment management.   
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section I demonstrates the hindsight bias in DW 
returns which can be mistaken for the effect of bad investor timing. Section II sets out a method 
for decomposing the GM-DW return differential into the bias component and the genuine effect 
of investor timing. Subsequent sections apply this decomposition to data for NYSE/AMEX 
stocks (sections III and IV) and NASDAQ stocks (section V). Conclusions are drawn in the final 
section. 
I. Identifying the Bias 
The source of the hindsight bias can be illustrated with reference to the simple game illustrated 
below, in which the player faces a gain/loss of 10% in each of two rounds (Figure 1a). If we 
assume that the outturns in each round have a probability of exactly 50%, then the expected 
terminal wealth equals the initial stake.  
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   Figure 1a                        Figure 1b  
 
The player may instead be able to quit the game following a win in the first round (Figure 
1b). The expected terminal wealth for this truncated tree is still 1.0, but by quitting following the 
initial win the player can bias other performance measures.  
For example, quitting early allows the player to claim a higher expected win rate. The full 
tree structure shows a 50% success rate. For example if we are trying to show “heads” in a fair 
coin toss then we have: HH, HT, TH, TT, giving success rates of 100%, 50%, 50%, 0%. But if 
the player quits if the first outcome is a head, then the tree shrinks to H, H, TH, TT, and the 
success rates shift to 100%, 100%, 50%, 0%, giving an impressive overall average of 62.5%. 
Quitting whilst ahead, and thus preserving a 100% winning record, biases this performance 
measure in a way which appears to suggest that the player has the ability to forecast the coin. The 
opposite incentive – to keep gambling when behind – can also be found. One simple example 
from outside the realm of finance is the child who agrees to toss a coin to settle an issue but, 
having lost, demands “best of three”.  
Quitting whilst ahead also biases the expected Internal Rate of Return (IRR, the term 
which is generally used for the dollar-weighted return in investment management – the two terms 
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are synonymous). Table II shows that the full tree gives an average IRR of close to zero 
(fractionally negative due to the arithmetic/geometric mean inequality). This rises to 2.4% if the 
player quits after a win in the first round, since quitting locks in the early gains and gives the 
same IRR as if another win was guaranteed in the second round. This quit-whilst-ahead bias is 
similar to the familiar problem of the re-investment assumption used in calculating the yield to 
maturity on bonds. 
Table II 
IRRs of Illustrative Two-Round Game 
The table shows the payoffs and associated internal rates of return of the two games 
shown in Figures 1a and 1b. An initial investment of 1 unit is assumed. The average 
IRR is the simple unweighted average of the IRRs calculated for the four scenarios.  
Period Lose-lose Lose-win Win-lose Win-win Avg.IRR 
 (a) Game Played over two periods 
0 -1 -1 -1 -1   
1 0 0 0 0   
2 0.81 0.99 0.99 1.21   
IRR -10.0% -0.5% -0.5% 10.0% -0.25% 
 (b) Player quits if ahead after round one    
0 -1 -1 -1 -1   
1 0 0 1.1 1.1   
2 0.81 0.99      
IRR -10.0% -0.5% 10.0% 10.0% 2.4% 
Phalippou (2008) notes that private equity managers can in this way boost their recorded 
IRRs by altering the time horizon of their investments - returning cash to investors rapidly for 
successful projects and extending the life of poorly-performing projects. We show below that 
IRRs can also be biased up when the time horizon is fixed. Ingersoll et al. (2007) show that 
investment managers can manipulate conventional performance measures by reducing risk 
exposure following a good performance and increasing exposure after a poor performance. The 
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underlying strategy is to quit whilst ahead, but gamble more following poor outturns. They show 
that measures such as the Sharpe ratio and Jensen’s alpha can be biased by this means, although 
they do not cover the IRR in their analysis.  
Individual investors have no corresponding incentive to bias the IRR recorded for their 
own savings, but the typical pattern of investor cashflows tends to introduce this bias 
accidentally. To demonstrate this we need to examine the reasons for this bias more formally. 
Dichev derives net distributions from data for market returns and market capitalization using the 
clean surplus identity identified by Peasnell (1982). If in any period the market capitalization Kt 
is less than would have been suggested by applying the monthly rate of return rt to the previous 
capitalization, then the differential must represent a distribution dt: 
tttt KrKd   )1(1               (1) 
If we regard the market capitalization Kt as the aggregate portfolio value across all 
investors, then when we discount at the internal rate of return (rdw), the present value of future 
cashflows and the final liquidation value by definition sum to the value of the initial investment: 
      
T
dw
T
T
t
t
dw
t
r
K
r
d
K )1()1(1
0                  (2) 
As set out in Dichev and Yu (2011), substituting equation 1 into equation 2 eliminates the 
distributions and shows that the IRR can be considered to be a dollar-weighted average of the 
individual monthly returns. Specifically, the relative weight that this DW return puts on the 
market return in any month (rt) is determined by the NPV of the assets that the investor holds in 
this market at the start of this period (discounted at the DW return): 
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             Tt ttdwtTt tdwtdw rrKrKr 1 11 1 )1()1(         (3)  
This formula shows how distributions and injections of additional funds re-weight the 
monthly returns rt. The resulting shifts in the DW return may represent either a genuine effect on 
expected investor wealth or a retrospective bias in the calculation. To illustrate these different 
effects we assume in Table III that we are calculating the overall DW return over an investment 
horizon of ten successive periods. We initially assume that there are no further cashflows after 
the initial investment, and that returns are IID. Our ex ante expectation would then be that the ten 
returns will be given equal weight (the first scenario shown in the table). We would expect the 
portfolio value to increase over time, but at a rate equal to the DW return, implying that the 
expected NPV of this portfolio would be equal in each period.  
After the event we are likely to see some variation in these NPVs, due to volatility in rt. 
But, to keep the illustration simple, we assume in Table III that this effect is small. If we invest a 
further amount, equal to the current portfolio value, after period 9, then the weight given to the 
period 10 return will be increased from 1/10 to 2/11. All earlier periods now have 1/11 weight, 
keeping the weights summing to unity. This is the second scenario illustrated in Table III. 
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        Table III 
  Illustrative Effects of Net Distributions on Return Weights 
The table shows the expected weights given in the DW return calculation to the returns in each period of a ten-
period investment horizon, given the cash injections/distributions shown in the first column. Four different 
cashflow profiles are considered. For simplicity returns are assumed IID, with low volatility.  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(1)  No injections/withdrawals 1/10 1/10 1/10 1/10 1/10 1/10 1/10 1/10 1/10 1/10 
(2)  Injection (=Kt) after period 9 1/11 1/11 1/11 1/11 1/11 1/11 1/11 1/11 1/11 2/11 
(3)  Injection (=Kt) after period 1 1/19 2/19 2/19 2/19 2/19 2/19 2/19 2/19 2/19 2/19 
(4)  Distrib’n (=Kt/2) after period 1 2/11 1/11 1/11 1/11 1/11 1/11 1/11 1/11 1/11 1/11 
 
If instead we had made a corresponding injection after period 1, then the weight on 
subsequent periods would have been raised only to 2/19. An injection or withdrawal cannot have 
a substantial effect on the weights given to a large number of subsequent periods since this would 
raise the overall sum of the NPVs across all periods, with limited impact on the relative weights. 
But this injection has a substantial impact on the first period’s weight, which falls from 1/10 to 
1/19 (scenario 3). Indeed, if we had instead distributed half the portfolio after period 1, halving 
the value of the remaining portfolio, then we would expect the first period return to be given 
twice the weight of each subsequent return (scenario 4). 
Thus injections/distributions can affect the weights given to previous returns just as much 
as the weights given to future returns. For example, comparing scenarios 2 and 4 shows that we 
can just as easily boost the expected weight given to r1 (by distributing half the portfolio after 
period 1) as the weight given to r10 (by doubling the size of the portfolio after period 9). In 
addition, comparing scenarios 2 and 3 shows that the effect of a given distribution/injection 
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depends on its timing within the overall investment horizon – a result confirmed in Appendix A 
using simulated data. 
We can re-arrange equation 3 further to show the deviation of periodic returns from the 
DW return. Periodic returns rt will be either above or below rdw, but the weighted sum of these 
differentials must be zero: 
         0)1(1 1   Tt dwttdwt rrrK              (4) 
This gives us a convenient form in which to consider the effect on the DW return of a 
distribution d (expressed as a percentage of portfolio value) at the end of period m: 
        
    0)1()1()1( 1 * 11 1        Tmt dwttdwtmt dwttdwt rrrKdrrrK            (5) 
The distribution reduces the weight given to future returns in calculating the DW return, 
by reducing the future portfolio values to a fraction (1-d) of what they otherwise would have 
been (Kt*). A negative distribution (a further investment, for example as the result of a share 
issue) correspondingly increases future portfolio values. In the extreme, an investor could 
liquidate the entire portfolio (d=1). The DW return would then be calculated just on the returns 
up to period m, giving no weight to subsequent market returns. 
Equation 5 shows that the two types of correlation that affect the GM-DW differential act 
in very different ways. A negative correlation between distributions and future returns would 
tend to boost the DW return, with negative distributions (injections) raising the start-of-period 
portfolio value ahead of periods of above-average returns, and positive distributions lowering it 
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ahead of weaker returns. This would represent good investor timing. Unfortunately this 
correlation is generally positive (see Table I), with investors tending to reduce their exposures 
ahead of periods of above-average returns and increase them ahead of poor returns.  
The correlation of distributions with previous returns can also affect the DW return by 
retrospectively altering the relative weight given to earlier returns. This correlation tends to be 
negative (eg. with above-average1 returns tending to be followed by injections of new funds). 
This will reduce the expected DW return by increasing the relative weight given to subsequent 
returns and correspondingly reducing the weight given to these earlier strong returns. 
The arithmetic appears similar for the backward-looking and forward-looking 
correlations, but these effects are very different. The forward-looking correlation works by 
altering investors’ portfolio size ahead of unusually strong/weak returns. Thus the change in the 
weight given to these returns in the DW return calculation corresponds to a change in investors’ 
exposure to these returns. By contrast, the correlation of distributions with past returns does not 
affect the portfolio value until after the relevant returns have already taken place - the relative 
weight given to these returns in the DW return calculation is adjusted retrospectively. A forward-
looking correlation between distributions and future returns represents good/bad timing, and 
clearly affects investor welfare. The backward-looking correlation does not. 
There is also an important distinction to be made in the information content of these 
different effects. Ingersoll et al. (2007) state an important principle: That a manipulation-proof 
                                                     
1
 The correlation coefficient is calculated using the arithmetic mean rather than the DW, but these two measures will 
of course be highly correlated. 
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performance measure must not reward information-free trading. The correlation of distributions 
with future returns clearly depends on trades which have a high information content, since they 
forecast future returns. The correlation of distributions with prior returns instead affects the DW 
return by means of trades which have a very low information content - all that is required is that 
the investor is sometimes able to judge that returns to date have been unusually high or low 
compared with likely returns in future. This is a much easier task.2 
An investment manager with no forecasting ability can boost his recorded DW return by 
making large distributions following a lucky period of strong returns, thus giving less weight to 
subsequent returns and correspondingly more weight to the returns already recorded. This is a 
form of the quit-whilst-ahead bias discussed above. Conversely a negative distribution could be 
used to increase the relative weight given to future returns after disappointing returns to date. 
For illustration we can consider a situation in which periodic returns are drawn from a 
distribution with a fixed mean μ. An investor with a negative forward-looking correlation will 
tend to invest more (negative distribution) ahead of periods where rt>μ. This investor will achieve 
higher returns over time because her forecasting ability means that her ex ante conditional 
expectation (conditioned on these forecasts) is greater than μ.  
An investor with no forecasting ability is still able to boost his expected DW return by 
retrospectively re-weighting the returns in previous periods. This can boost the expected DW 
                                                     
2
 It may be difficult to judge whether the return to date in any specific period differs significantly from the long-term 
mean, but investors can be opportunistic: if there is ever a period when the return to date has reached levels which 
are clearly different from any plausible estimate of the long-term mean then investors can use net distributions at this 
point to bias the DW return (for example, the cumulative return drops to well below zero in the early years of our 
NYSE/AMEX dataset – see Table V). By contrast, forecasting future returns is always likely to be difficult. 
  15  
return, but not in any way which is likely to help meet his underlying investment objectives since 
his ex ante expected return in each period is still μ. The evidence in Table I suggests that 
distributions tend to show a significant negative correlation with past returns, biasing the DW 
return downwards. 
Monte Carlo simulations confirm that this bias can spuriously affect the DW return. 
Friesen and Sapp (2007) show the results of simulations where returns are NIID. The ex ante 
expected return each period is identical, so any weighting of these ex ante returns must give the 
same average, regardless of the relative weights used. Volatility in ex post returns will drag the 
geometric mean below this arithmetic mean, but the simulations show that when distributions are 
correlated with previous returns the DW return is significantly lower than the geometric mean. 
By construction, there is no correlation between distributions and future returns, so this reduction 
must be due to ex post re-weighting of past returns. The simulations presented in Appendix A of 
the present paper confirm this result. 
Hayley (2010) shows that the same hindsight bias is also responsible for the superior 
returns claimed for value averaging (a formula investment strategy which requires investors to 
make regular periodic investments to keep their portfolio growing at a pre-specified target rate). 
This strategy builds in a strong correlation of periodic investments with prior returns, since a 
smaller (larger) additional investment is required following strong (weak) market returns, thus 
giving relatively less (more) weight to future returns, which are likely to be lower (higher). This 
gives rise to an IRR which is greater than the geometric mean even in simulated random walk 
data where the ex ante expected return in each period is constant by construction. 
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The following section sets out a method for decomposing the observed GM-DW return 
differential into the effects of the backward-looking correlation (hindsight bias) and forward-
looking correlation (bad timing) effects. 
II. A Method For Decomposing The Effects Of Distributions 
Equation 5 allows us to calculate the effect of a distribution in period m on the expected DW 
return, but it cannot in itself distinguish the effects of the forward-looking and backward-looking 
correlations in historic time series. The period weights sum to unity so, for example, increasing 
the weight given to above-average returns after period m would automatically reduce the weight 
given to earlier below-average returns. Thus we cannot directly distinguish between the two 
effects discussed above.  
At first sight this seems to be an insoluble problem. However, a fund manager would 
require very limited information to use the quit-whilst-ahead strategy to deliberately bias the DW 
return - all that is required is an estimate of μ. Thus we should be able to identify retrospectively 
the expected impact of such a strategy on the DW return conditional on a similar assumption for 
future returns. Specifically, if we assume μ is constant, then we can evaluate the retrospective 
bias that each distribution has on the expected DW return. Repeating the process for each 
successive distribution will give us the total bias.  
We start by assuming that the expected return in each period is equal to the geometric 
mean recorded for the whole investment horizon (this prevents the AM/GM differential from 
biasing our results) and that the distribution each month is zero. We will relax each of these 
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assumptions later. On these assumptions, the DW return over the investment horizon as a whole 
will initially be equal to the GM. We then substitute in the historical value for the return in the 
first period (r1), recalculate the DW return for the entire series, and record the amount by which 
this is different from our initial DW return estimate. Next we substitute in the historical 
distribution for that period, recalculate the DW return again and note how much this has changed 
from our previous estimate (which was based on r1 and assumed values for all other data). This 
sequence reflects the assumption in equation 1 that distributions are made at the end of each 
month, after the return for the month is known. 
Substituting in the actual distribution data can be interpreted as replicating the process by 
which a cynical investment manager would bias the DW return. Each month, once the monthly 
return is known, he decides on the net distribution. Having no short-term forecasting ability, the 
manager assumes that all future returns will be equal to μ. If returns to date are significantly 
different from μ, then distributions/injections can immediately increase the expected DW return 
by increasing the weight given to previous good returns or reducing the weight given to previous 
bad returns.  
These distribution decisions would have low information content in the sense that they are 
not predicated on a forecast of short-term asset returns. They require only an estimate of μ (and 
as we will see below, the results are not very sensitive to the accuracy of this estimate). The sum 
of the changes in the estimated DW return as a result of each of these net distributions thus gives 
us the cumulative effect of these low information trades.  
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If the distributions turn out to anticipate future returns, then this will be recorded when 
these subsequent returns are substituted into the calculation. The effect of successive return data 
on the estimated DW return is likely to be noisy, but if there is no relationship between these 
returns and earlier distributions then these effects will tend to cancel out over time. The 
cumulative effect on the estimated DW return will be positive only to the extent that previous net 
distributions resulted in relatively large start-of-period portfolio values (with correspondingly 
large NPVs) for periods when the returns were high, and relatively low NPVs ahead of periods 
when returns were low. This captures the effect of the good/bad timing of previous net 
distributions. As discussed above, this is a genuine economic effect rather than a bias, and will 
only come about if previous distributions contained information about future returns.  
Our decomposition starts with the DW return equal to the GM, but by recalculating the 
DW return after each new piece of data is substituted in, we gradually move to the historic DW 
return. We consider separately (i) the aggregate effect on the DW return of including the 
distribution data (this gives the bias effect resulting from re-weighing past returns), and (ii) the 
aggregate effect on the DW return of the monthly return data (this gives the timing effects, 
reflecting any information in the distributions about future returns). These two components sum 
to give the total GM-DW return differential. 
  19  
      Table IV 
Impact of Distributions on the DW Return (NYSE/AMEX) 
This shows for early years of the NYSE/AMEX dataset the effect each year’s return 
(timing effect) and distribution (bias) have on the expected DW return for the whole 
investment horizon (1926-2002). Future returns are assumed constant at 9.87% per annum. 
For clarity the table shows annual data, but underlying calculations use monthly data, so 
the precise effects depend on the timing of these distributions within these years. 
 
Annual  
return     
Annualised 
return to date 
Net 
distribution   
Timing  
effect Bias  
1926 9.6% 9.6% -3.1% 0.00% 0.00% 
1927 33.3% 20.9% -3.2% 0.25% -0.01% 
1928 39.0% 26.6% 0.1% 0.31% -0.01% 
1929 -14.6% 14.7% -9.4% -0.33% -0.06% 
1930 -28.8% 4.3% -5.3% -0.57% 0.00% 
1931 -44.4% -6.1% 6.6% -0.89% -0.04% 
1932 -8.5% -6.4% 7.4% -0.24% -0.07% 
1933 9.9% . 0% . . 
1934 9.9% . 0% . . 
. . . . . . 
2002 9.9% . 0% . . 
  
Table IV illustrates this process, with historical data having been substituted over our 
starting assumptions up to 1932. The large negative distribution in 1929 had two effects. In 
aggregate investors added new cash equivalent to 9.4% of their existing portfolios. This 
subsequently turned out to be very bad timing: It increased portfolio values and so boosted the 
effect on the DW return of the subsequent negative returns. However, even before any further 
return data were included, the cash injection in 1929 had an immediate impact on the expected 
DW return by increasing the weight given to future returns (assumed equal to the 9.9% overall 
GM) and reducing the weight given to returns up to 1929, which were then well above this 
average. This re-weighting resulted in the immediate -0.06% bias effect shown for 1929. 
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Conversely, the large cash distributions in 1931 and 1932 reduced the weight given to future 
returns and boosted the weight given to returns to date, which by then were far below average. 
This gave rise to an immediate hindsight bias which again reduced the DW return. 
This decomposition reflects the distinction between the forward-looking correlation of 
distributions with future returns and the backward-looking correlation with past returns. Future 
returns are assumed constant, so by construction the decomposed effects are calculated on the 
basis that past return and distribution data bear no relationship to future returns. But as we 
substitute in the actual distribution for each successive period, the impact on the estimated DW 
return reflects any relationship between this distribution and previous returns. Correspondingly, 
the effect on the estimated DW return as we substitute in each new piece of return data reflects 
any relationship with previous distributions. Thus substituting in the distribution data captures 
any effects of the backward-looking correlation with previous returns (the hindsight bias), whilst 
substituting in the return data captures the forward-looking correlation of previous distributions 
with the current rt (the effect of good or bad investor timing). 
III. Decomposing The Effects On the DW Return For NYSE/AMEX Stocks 
We use the same dataset as Dichev (NYSE and AMEX stocks January 1926 to December 2002), 
and the same method to infer net distributions from the capitalization and return figures. We then 
step through the entire dataset adding first the monthly return, then the monthly distribution, 
calculating the DW return after each piece of data is added. The GM is 9.87% and the DW 8.61% 
(1926 to 2002). However, we find that the overall -1.26% per annum differential decomposes 
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into an annualized -0.21% from adding the return data and -0.95% from adding the distribution 
data (see Table V). This shows that the large majority of the GM-DW differential is due to 
hindsight bias, with only a limited effect from bad investor timing.3 
          Table V 
Decomposition Of Timing And Bias Effects (NYSE/AMEX) 
Cumulative effect on the DW return of substituting in (i) return data (timing effect), 
(ii) distributions (bias). By construction, for monthly data DW return = GM return + 
timing effect + bias, although this summation is only approximate for the annualized 
returns shown here. 
 GM return Timing    
effect Bias     DW return 
Jan. 1926 - Dec. 2002 9.87% -0.21% -0.95% 8.61% 
Jan. 1926 - Dec. 2006 10.22% -0.25% -0.98% 8.88% 
This method allows us to identify the impact of each new data point as we step through 
the data. Figure 2 presents the annualized return to date and the annual net distribution as a 
proportion of the implied portfolio value at the time. Figure 3 shows the corresponding 
incremental effects on the DW return resulting from adding successive data for returns (the 
investor timing effect) and distributions (the hindsight bias). The timing effect is noisy, but small 
in aggregate, whereas the hindsight bias is consistently negative in the early part of the period.  
                                                     
3
 Some papers have also found bad investor timing using data on equity issues (e.g. Ritter, 1991, Ritter and 
Loughran, 1995), although others question these results (e.g. Brav and Gompers, 1997 and Schultz, 2003). The 
present paper does not revisit this well-established debate: It shows instead that whatever their statistical 
significance, the economic significance of these bad timing effects is far smaller than is suggested by the studies 
detailed in Table I. 
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Figure 2: Returns to date and net distributions (NYSE/AMEX stocks). The line shows the annualized 
cumulative return to date (%) from the start of the dataset in January 1926. The bars show net distributions as a 
percentage of the implied total market capitalization before the distribution (Kt-1(1+rt)). A positive distribution is a 
return of cash to investors, a negative distribution is a net investment. 
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Figure 3: Timing and bias effects in DW returns (NYSE/AMEX stocks). This shows the change in the expected 
DW return for the whole period (January 1926 - December 2002) resulting from substituting in (i) the monthly 
market return (‘timing effect’, the volatile bold line), and then (ii) the monthly aggregate net distribution (‘bias’, the 
thinner, more stable line). The DW return is calculated on the initial assumption that future returns are equal to the 
geometric mean (9.87% per annum) and that future distributions are zero. The underlying calculations use monthly 
data, but annual effects are shown here for clarity. 
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It is also reassuring that Figure 3 shows no massive monthly jumps. This suggests that the 
DW return calculation has found the same underlying root to the IRR polynomial in every 
calculation, with only modest changes due to the new data. If it ever jumped between multiple 
solutions then we might expect to see a far larger monthly move. 
The large cash distributions in 1931 and 1932 reduced the weight given to future returns 
and boosted the weight given to returns to date, which by then were far below average. As we 
saw above, this gave rise to an immediate hindsight bias which again reduced the DW return. The 
incremental bias effect remained negative in the late 1930s and early 1940s as consistently large 
distributions were made whilst the return to date was below 5%. Distributions in later years 
caused relatively little bias since by this stage the return to date had inevitably converged towards 
the overall average. Consistent with this, extending the dataset makes little difference, with the 
return and distribution effects shifting only from -0.21% and -0.95% respectively (1926 to 2002) 
to -0.25% and -0.98% (1926 to 2006). 
The method derived here for decomposing the GM – DW return differential clearly has 
applications in other fields where DW returns are used, notably project finance and investment 
management. Good timing by investment manager should clearly be separated from the effect of 
hindsight bias (whether deliberate or accidental). For this purpose the method above should be 
used to calculate a hindsight-corrected DW return, which can be derived by adding the timing 
effect to the GM return or, equivalently, subtracting the hindsight bias from the DW return: 
RH (hindsight-corrected DW return) =  GM return + timing effect = DW return – bias  (6) 
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IV.  Sensitivity Analysis 
In this section we examine the robustness of our results as we relax the initial assumptions made 
above: (i) that future returns are equal to the GM of 9.87% per annum; (ii) that future 
distributions are zero. Our assumption that distributions are made at the end of each month makes 
minimal difference: when we assume instead that they are made at the start of each month, the 
decomposed effects differ by less than 0.01%. 
Table VI sets out the timing and bias effects derived using a wide range of assumptions 
for future returns. The timing effect calculated on such counterfactual assumptions is relatively 
uninformative: Assuming returns which are well below the historical mean naturally leads to a 
more positive timing effect as returns subsequently tend to be higher than this (high assumed 
returns lead to correspondingly negative return surprises). Our interest is instead in the bias 
effect. The table covers a huge range of assumed average returns, but our key finding is robust, 
since for any plausible figure in the middle part of this range the bias effect is clearly substantial 
and negative, and accounts for a large part of the -1.3% historical GM-DW differential. 
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Table VI 
Decomposition on Alternative Return Assumptions 
The table shows the cumulative effect of monthly returns (timing effect) and 
distributions (bias) on the expected DW return for NYSE/AMEX stocks 1926-2002. 
Future returns are initially assumed constant at the levels shown in the first column. By 
construction, for monthly returns the DW return = assumed GM + timing effect + bias, 
although this summation is only approximate for the annualized returns shown here. 
Assumed GM  Timing effect  Bias  DW return 
5% 3.49% -0.04% 8.61% 
6% 2.76% -0.28% 8.61% 
7% 2.01% -0.49% 8.61% 
8% 1.24% -0.67% 8.61% 
9% 0.47% -0.83% 8.61% 
10% -0.31% -0.97% 8.61% 
11% -1.10% -1.09% 8.61% 
12% -1.89% -1.19% 8.61% 
13% -2.67% -1.28% 8.61% 
14% -3.46% -1.37% 8.61% 
15% -4.24% -1.44% 8.61% 
 
Moreover, we do not need to interpret these assumptions as reflecting investor 
expectations. Considering how a cynical investment manager could attempt to bias the DW 
return helped lead us to the decomposition set out above, but this should be seen as just an 
analogy. As discussed in section II, the key requirement is that our assumed future returns are 
constant, with no relationship with past returns or distributions. This ensures that all forward-
looking correlation of distributions with future returns is captured in the “timing effect” column 
as the subsequent return data is substituted in, whilst all the backward-looking correlation 
between distributions and previous returns is captured in the “bias” column. This holds regardless 
of whether the return assumption actually reflects investor expectations. The key advantage of 
setting the assumed future returns equal to the historical geometric mean is that this removes the 
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effect of consistent return surprises in either direction, leaving only the pure effect of the timing 
of investment flows compared to periods of above/below average return. 
We also investigate the effect of changing our initial assumption for future distributions 
(set to zero for all periods in the decompositions above). Setting each instead to 0.082% of 
market capitalization (giving an average distribution equal to that in the historic sample) 
substantially alters the decomposition, with the aggregate bias effect increasing to -1.15% and the 
timing effect almost vanishing (-0.04%). The reason can be seen in Figure 4, which shows that 
returns on NYSE/AMEX stocks (cumulated over 10 year periods to reduce short-term noise) 
trended upwards over our sample period of January 1926 to December 2002. Given this trend, 
any early distribution would appear to be bad timing compared to our initial assumption that 
future distributions were zero. 
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Figure 4: Long-term equity returns. The chart shows the annualized 10 year geometric 
mean market return starting in the period shown. A linear time trend has been added, fitted to 
NYSE/AMEX returns Jan. 1926-Dec. 2002. The longer time series shows the S&P index 
return (source: Shiller). Data after Dec. 2002 is shown as dotted lines. 
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However we should not accept the effects of this trend at face value. First, bad investment 
timing is generally interpreted as a short-term cyclical effect as investors chase returns during 
booms. Apparent bad timing caused by this very long term trend is a very different effect. As 
most investors have horizons which are substantially shorter than this 77 year time series, they 
had no realistic option to time their investments better. Moreover it is entirely implausible to 
suppose that this upward trend will continue in future – this would imply that expected equity 
returns are currently over 15% per annum and will continue to rise by almost 1% per decade. 
Figure 4 also shows the similar S&P index returns going back to 1871 and forward to 
2010. This shows that the 1926 to 2002 period was almost unique in showing such a sustained 
uptrend. Almost any other period of equal length would have given us very different results. Thus 
if we are to obtain results that can be plausibly applied to the future (e.g. in estimating the 
expected risk premium) we need to strip out the effects of this trend before decomposing the 
residual into the timing and bias effects. This can be achieved either by de-trending the return 
series or de-meaning the distribution. For robustness we do both, on a variety of different 
assumptions, both individually and combined. 
Table VII presents the results using four alternative treatments of the distribution data. 
We have already seen the first two, which use unadjusted historical distribution data. The third 
and fourth variants de-mean the distribution data by subtracting a percentage of portfolio value 
such that (a) the average distribution is zero (b) the average percentage of capitalisation which is 
distributed is zero. The last four variants repeat the first four, but with return data from which a 
log-linear trend has been extracted (thus keeping the GM return unchanged). 
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Table VII 
Decomposition With Alternative Corrections For Trend In Returns (% pa.) 
The table shows the cumulative effect of monthly return and distribution data on the expected DW return for 
NYSE/AMEX stocks 1926-2002 using a range of measures to correct for the long-term uptrend in returns and the 
positive mean distribution. The first two use raw distribution data with an assumption that future distributions are (1) 
zero, (2) set to the sample average as a percentage of implied market capitalization. These decompositions are 
repeated for distribution data which has been de-meaned by subtracting a percentage of market capitalization such 
that (3) the average distribution is zero, (4) the average percentage of market capitalization which is distributed is 
zero. The last four variants repeat the first four, but with return data from which a log-linear trend has been removed. 
Return Data  Distribution data and starting assumption Timing 
effect Bias 
DW 
return 
1. Unadjusted rt Unadjusted dt (future dt initially set at zero) -0.21% -0.95% 8.61% 
2. Unadjusted rt Unadjusted dt (future dt(%) initially set at sample avg.) -0.04% -1.15% 8.61% 
3. Unadjusted rt De-meaned dt (future dt* initially set at zero) -0.12% -0.53% 9.17% 
4. Unadjusted rt De-meaned dt (future dt* (%) initially set at zero) -0.06% -0.29% 9.50% 
5. Detrended rt Unadjusted dt (future dt initially set at zero) -0.03% -0.49% 9.31% 
6. Detrended rt Unadjusted dt (future dt(%) initially set at sample avg.) 0.04% -0.58% 9.31% 
7. Detrended rt De-meaned dt (future dt* initially set at zero) -0.06% -0.26% 9.51% 
8. Detrended rt De-meaned dt (future dt* (%) initially set at zero) -0.06% -0.36% 9.43% 
 
The first two variants use unadjusted historical data, thus ending up with the historical 
DW return of 8.61%. By contrast the other variants (3 to 8) adjust the historic data to remove the 
effect of the long-term trend in returns. These new variants all give substantially higher final DW 
returns but, reassuringly, these lie within a limited range 9.17% to 9.51%. Thus all these methods 
suggest that this long-term uptrend accounted for a substantial part of the raw GM-DW 
differential, and only around half resulted from shorter-term effects. Thus even before 
decomposing the residual into bias and timing effects it is clear that these two together have 
much less effect once we strip out the long-term uptrend in returns. Moreover, decomposing the 
remaining differential shows that the timing effect is very small in all cases, ranging from -0.12% 
to +0.04%.  
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Thus after adjusting for (i) the unsustainable uptrend in returns, and (ii) hindsight bias in 
the DW return, we find that bad timing actually had only a very small impact on the return 
received by investors. Thus, in contrast to the claims made elsewhere, bad investor timing does 
not justify reducing our estimates of the equity risk premium. 
V.  Decomposing The Return Differential For NASDAQ Stocks 
NASDAQ stocks show a much larger differential than NYSE/AMEX stocks, with a GM of 9.6%, 
but a DW return of only 4.2% (January 1973 to December 2002). When we decompose this 
differential using the method set out above, we find that the large majority (-4.0%) is due to bad 
investor timing, with only -1.0% due to hindsight bias (see Table VIII). 
Table VIII 
Decomposition of Timing and Bias Effects (NASDAQ) 
Cumulative effect of monthly returns (timing effect) and distributions (bias) on the 
expected DW return for NASDAQ stocks. By construction, for monthly returns DW 
return = GM return + timing effect + bias, although this summation is only approximate 
for the annualized returns shown here. 
 GM return Timing 
effect Bias  DW return 
Jan. 1973 - Dec. 2002 9.6% -4.0% -1.0% 4.2% 
Jan. 1973 - Dec. 2006 10.4% -1.8% -0.9% 7.5% 
 
The main effect comes from investors’ terrible timing during the dotcom boom. 
Additional funds equivalent to 8.6% of market capitalization were invested in 1999 and 13.7% in 
2000, just ahead of the crash (see Figure 5).  
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Naturally, the recorded effect of bad timing rises as we increase our assumption for future 
returns, but it is reassuring that the degree of hindsight bias remains fairly stable (see Table IX). 
Moreover, the decomposition shows very little sensitivity to the assumed level of future 
distributions (consistent with the absence of any long-term trend in returns). Thus our estimates 
of the bias are robust to shifts in both these assumptions. 
Table IX 
NASDAQ Return Decomposition: Alternative Return Assumptions 
The table shows how cumulative timing and bias effects vary as we alter our 
assumption for future returns. Returns are initially assumed constant at the levels shown 
in the first column before historical returns are substituted in. For monthly returns DW 
return = assumed GM return + timing effect + bias, but this summation is only 
approximate for the annualized returns shown. Coverage: NASDAQ stocks 1973-2002. 
Assumed GM  Timing effect  Bias  DW return 
5% 0.59% -1.31% 4.25% 
6% -0.44% -1.23% 4.25% 
7% -1.45% -1.15% 4.25% 
8% -2.44% -1.08% 4.25% 
9% -3.40% -1.02% 4.25% 
10% -4.35% -0.96% 4.25% 
11% -5.28% -0.90% 4.25% 
12% -6.19% -0.85% 4.25% 
13% -7.08% -0.80% 4.25% 
14% -7.95% -0.75% 4.25% 
15% -8.80% -0.71% 4.25% 
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Figure 5: Distributions and annual returns (NASDAQ stocks). The line shows the annual 
return on NASDAQ stocks (Jan. 1973 – Dec. 2002). The bars show annual net distributions as a 
percentage of the market capitalization ahead of the distribution (Kt-1(1+rt)). A positive 
distribution is a return of cash to investors, a negative distribution a net investment. 
 
However, as Keswani and Stolin (2008) showed, when the dataset is extended to 2006 the 
GM-DW return differential shrinks markedly. The decomposition shows that the cumulative 
timing effect changes from -4.0% to only -1.8%. One reason for this is the positive returns seen 
after 2002, but the timing effect would have diminished even if the additional data were 
unexceptional. As we saw in Section I (and is confirmed by the simulations in Appendix A), for 
any given relationship between distributions and subsequent returns, timing effects are far more 
powerful for distributions close to the end of the investment horizon, since they then have a large 
effect on the weights given to subsequent returns in the DW return calculation. The same pattern 
of distributions and subsequent returns would tend to have much less impact further from the end 
of the horizon, since the distributions would then affect start-of-month portfolio values over a 
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larger number of subsequent periods, implying less impact on their relative weights in the DW 
return calculation.4  
The historical data 1973 to 2006 still shows a -1.8% effect from bad investor timing, but 
we face two problems in assuming that bad timing will continue to have such an effect in future. 
First, this effect stems from what should be seen as a single massive event – the dotcom crash – 
so we must question whether this is statistically significant. Second, we must expect the 
measured bad timing effect to shrink further as more data is added, pushing the 2000 to 2002 
period further away from the end of the investment horizon. 
VI. Conclusion 
A growing number of papers use the difference between the dollar-weighted return and the 
geometric mean return as a measure of the effect of bad investment timing. They generally find 
that poor timing has reduced the return actually received by investors to well below the buy-and-
hold return on the assets concerned. As a result they conclude that our estimates of the equity risk 
premium need to be revised down substantially. Given the central role that this figure plays in 
finance, this would have profound implications. 
However, the present paper finds that the DW return is affected by the correlation of net 
investor cashflows with both future asset returns and previous asset returns. The first effect 
                                                     
4
 Using artificial data for these extra years (returns set equal to the GM to date (9.62%) and distributions set to zero) 
reduces the aggregate timing effect to only -2.5% (from -4.0% for 1973-2002). This confirms that the majority of the 
reduction is inherent in the extension of the dataset, rather than being due to the specific data added. 
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clearly affects investors’ expected wealth, but the second merely gives rise to a hindsight bias in 
the DW return.  
This paper derives a method which allows us to separate these two effects. This shows 
that bad investment timing accounts for very little of the overall differential between the GM and 
DW returns for mainstream US equities (those traded on the NYSE and AMEX exchanges). The 
great majority is just hindsight bias. Thus low DW returns should not lead us to adopt 
correspondingly low figures for the equity risk premium. 
There are likely to be applications in other fields. Wherever DW returns (IRRs) are 
quoted this technique can be used to separate hindsight bias from any genuine timing effect. This 
is likely to be useful in project finance and investment management, where IRRs are still 
routinely used as summary performance measures. The decomposition described above can be 
used to derive hindsight-corrected IRRs. 
More specifically, future research could investigate the degree to which funds have 
benefited from hindsight bias. This could have come about if funds tend to choose between 
alternative cashflow options by comparing the projected IRRs, or if funds which benefit from this 
bias by luck tend to have higher survival rates. As we saw above, the effects of this bias can be 
substantial even for broad equity market indices. They could be much larger for individual funds 
which are likely to have considerably greater volatility in both their returns and their cashflows. 
  34  
REFERENCES 
Brav, Alon and Paul A. Gompers. 1997, Myth or reality? The long-run underperformance of initial 
public offerings: Evidence from venture and non-venture capital-backed companies, Journal of Finance 
52: 1791-1821. 
Clare, Andrew and Nick Motson. 2010. “Do UK investors buy at the top and sell at the bottom?” Cass 
Business School Working Paper. 
Dichev, Ilia D. 2007. “What are Stock Investors' Actual Historical Returns? Evidence from Dollar-
Weighted Returns.” American Economic Review,  97(1): 386-401. 
Dichev, Ilia D and Gwen Yu. 2011. “Higher Risk, Lower Returns: What Hedge Fund Investors Really 
Earn.” Journal of Financial Economics 100(2): 248-263. 
Friesen, Geoffrey C. and Travis R.A. Sapp. 2007. “Mutual Fund Flows and Investor Returns: An 
Empirical Examination of Fund Investor Timing Ability.” Journal of Banking and Finance 31: 2796-
2816. 
Gompers, Paul A, and Josh Lerner. 2003, The really long-run performance of initial public offerings: 
The pre-NASDAQ evidence. Journal of Finance 58(4): 1355–1392. 
Hayley, Simon. 2010. “Value Averaging and the Automated Bias of Performance Measures.” Cass 
Business School working paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1606347  
Ingersoll, Jonathan, Matthew Spiegel, William Goetzmann and Ivo Welch. 2007. "Portfolio 
Performance Manipulation and Manipulation-proof Performance Measures." Review of Financial 
Studies 20(5):1503-1546. 
Keswani, Aneel and David Stolin. 2008. “Dollar-Weighted Returns to Stock Investors: A New Look at 
the Evidence.” Finance Research Letters, 5(4). 
Loughran, Tim, and Jay R. Ritter. 1995. “The New Issues Puzzle.” Journal of Finance, 50(1): 23-51. 
Peasnell, Ken V. 1982. “Some Formal Connections Between Economic Values And Yields And 
Accounting Numbers.” Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 9(3): 361–381. 
Phalippou, Ludovic. 2008. “The Hazards of Using IRR to Measure Performance: The Case of Private 
Equity”. Journal of Performance Measurement. 
Schultz, Paul. 2003. “Pseudo Market Timing and the Long-Run Underperformance of IPOs”. Journal of 
Finance, 63(2): 483-517. 
Shiller, Robert J. 2005. Irrational Exuberance. Princeton University Press, 2nd edition, and 
www.irrationalexuberance.com. 
Zweig, Jason. “Funds that really make money for their investors.” Money Magazine, 1st April 1997. 
  35  
 
Appendix: Simulation Evidence 
 
This section uses Monte-Carlo simulations to show that the correlation of distributions with prior 
returns can shift the average DW return away from the geometric mean even when the ex ante 
expected return in each period is identical by construction. We also confirm that the size of this 
bias depends on the timing of the cashflows within the investment horizon. 
Returns are generated over an investment horizon comprising ten periods. These returns 
are NIID, and for convenience the mean is set so that the GM return over the ten periods averages 
zero. We then consider the impact that a single net distribution after each of periods 1-9 has on 
the DW return (all assets are assumed to be liquidated in the tenth period). Net distributions are 
either (a) negatively correlated with the previous return (as investors chase returns by investing 
more following strong returns), or (b) positively correlated with the return in the following period 
(bad investor timing). Note that these are the signs of the correlations generally found in the 
empirical studies shown in Table I.  
Figure 6 shows that each of these correlations pulls the average DW return below the GM 
return (the opposite correlations – not shown – have a positive effect). The forward-looking 
correlation reduces the conditional expected return in the period following the distribution 
(conditioned on the amount which remains invested). By contrast, where the distributions are 
only correlated with past returns the ex ante expected return in each period is identical by 
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construction, so we should regard the shift in the DW return as a hindsight bias produced by the 
retrospective shifts in the weights given to past returns. 
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Figure 6: Impact on DW returns of correlation between distributions and returns. Each simulated path is of ten 
periods, with returns in each period NIID with standard deviation 20% and geometric mean zero. A single 
distribution is included for each path in the period shown. This distribution is set as a percentage of portfolio value 
which is (i) the previous period’s percentage return multiplied by -1, or (ii) identical to the following period’s 
percentage return. Net distributions in all other periods are zero for each path. The impact of these cashflows in 
pulling the DW return below the GM return is calculated for each of 5000 simulated return paths for each of the 
distribution patterns shown. The GM is, of course, unaffected by these cashflows, so the differential is interpreted as 
the negative impact of these cashflows on the DW return.  
 
The size of these effects depends on when each distribution comes within the investment 
horizon, but the average size of the effect across all periods is roughly the same for the forward-
looking and backward-looking correlations. This confirms the underlying symmetry apparent in 
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equation 5: That a distribution can in principle affect the DW return just as effectively by re-
weighting either past returns or future returns. 
A distribution which is correlated with returns in the coming period is most effective in 
period 9, since it can then have a substantial effect on the NPV of the portfolio value at the start 
of period 10, and hence on the relative weight given to this return in the DW return calculation. 
By contrast, a similar distribution after period 1 alters the portfolio value in all future periods, 
and so has little effect on their relative weights. But such early distributions strongly affect the 
relative weight given to previous returns. Thus a forward-looking correlation has more impact 
near the end of the investment horizon and the backward-looking correlation has more impact 
near the beginning.  
Decomposing the effects on the DW return for NYSE/AMEX stocks (Section III) shows 
that the major impact comes from a backward-looking correlation of distributions early in the 
investment period with prior returns. The same pattern of distributions and returns would have 
had less impact on the DW return if our sample had started earlier. 
For NASDAQ stocks we found instead that the major impact is the bad timing of the large 
net investments made at the height of the dotcom boom – ahead of the subsequent bust. But, 
again, the fact that these flows took place very near the end of the investment horizon gives them 
the maximum effect on the DW return. We found that the effect is reduced as more recent data is 
added, pushing these large distributions away from the end of the horizon, and we should expect 
further reductions as subsequent data is added. 
